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Abstract
Background: The size of a person’s signature may reveal implicit information about how the self is perceived although this
has not been closely examined.
Methods/Results: We conducted three experiments to test whether increases in signature size can be induced. Specifically,
the aim of these experiments was to test whether changes in signature size reflect a person’s current implicit sense of
embodiment. Experiment 1 showed that an implicit affect task (positive subliminal evaluative conditioning) led to increases
in signature size relative to an affectively neutral task, showing that implicit affective cues alter signature size. Experiments 2
and 3 demonstrated increases in signature size following experiential self-focus on sensory and affective stimuli relative to
both conceptual self-focus and external (non-self-focus) in both healthy participants and patients with anorexia nervosa, a
disorder associated with self-evaluation and a sense of disembodiment. In all three experiments, increases in signature size
were unrelated to changes in self-reported mood and larger than manipulation unrelated variations.
Conclusions: Together, these findings suggest that a person’s sense of embodiment is reflected in their signature size.
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Introduction
Variations in the size of a person’s signature have long been of
interest to graphologists and personality researchers who regard
signatures as expressive movements that reveal implicit informa-
tion about how individuals perceive the self [1]. Few scientific
studies have examined this idea with the exception of those by
Zweigenhaft and colleagues in the 1970s. This work suggests that
differences in signature size reflect variations in perceived social
status or self-esteem. Zweigenhaft [2] noticed that U.S. professors
had larger signatures than students, observations that were
subsequently replicated in U.S. [3] and Irani samples [4] where
differences in signature size were apparent even when groups were
matched on the size and number of letters that the signatures
contained. Furthermore, Zweigenhaft and Marlowe [5] showed
that differences in signature size could be induced by experimental
manipulations of self-esteem. Students who received positive
feedback on a bogus intelligence test or were asked to imagine
themselves in powerful roles (e.g., the U.S. president) had larger
signatures than age-matched peers who received negative feedback
or imagined themselves in less powerful roles (e.g., an office clerk).
These results suggest that processes related to how individuals
currently perceive the self influence their signature size. More
specifically, Zweigenhaft [6] speculated that the larger signatures
in the above studies were due to a momentary sense of
accomplishment, drawing attention to the experience of physical
states that accompanies cognition. Although this idea has not been
further examined, it finds support in models of embodied
cognition which propose that cognition is grounded in its physical
context [7,8]. According to this view, experiences of bodily states are
not just sequelae of cognition but fundamental to the operation of
cognitive processes. A growing body of evidence supports this
proposition. For instance, studies have found that participants’
evaluation of stimuli is influenced by subtle manipulations of their
postures or facial expressions. Strack, Martin and Stepper [9]
showed that participants evaluated cartoons more favorably when
they adopted facial expressions that facilitated contraction of the
facial musculature involved in smiling (e.g., by holding a pencil
between their lips) than when this contraction was inhibited. Wells
and Petty [10] found that participants reported more positive
attitudes towards a message played to them via headphones when
they were concurrently nodding (as opposed to shaking) their
head. Similarly, postures and haptic sensations that are inciden-
tally imposed by the environment have been shown to modulate
the experience of affect [11], the perception of other people and
situations [12], and moral behaviors [13].The evidence from these
studies therefore supports the view that physical states play an
important role in the construction of mental concepts and that
bodily processes are an integral part of cognition. Thus, consistent
with Zweigenhaft’s [6] reasoning, the experience of bodily
processes may account for changes in signature size.
The aim of the present studies was to investigate this
embodiment view of signature size. We carried out three
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e88438
experiments to examine this idea. Our first experiment examined
whether changes in signature size could be induced by exposing
participants to affective stimuli that they are unaware of. Although
signature size has been regarded as a measure of implicit processes,
this has not been conclusively demonstrated. Effects of implicit
affective cues (i.e., those that do not elicit conscious feelings of
positive or negative emotional arousal) on cognition have been
widely documented [14], suggesting that implicit stimuli may also
affect signature size. The effects of bodily states such as in the
studies cited above are often implicit which is consistent with the
idea that awareness is not a necessary part of the embodiment
process [8,15] and that implicit stimuli may affect signature size
when they are associated with the experience of bodily states.
Indeed, Duguid and Goncalo [16] recently found that inducing a
sense of power caused participants to perceive themselves as taller
than their actual height (i.e., altering their perceived body size) in
the absence of concurrent changes in verbal reports of mood.
Thus, our first experiment examined the impact of an implicit
affect task on signature size. We hypothesized that implicit positive
affective cues would lead to increases in signature size in the
absence of concurrent changes in self-reported mood and self-
esteem.
As argued above, the embodiment view of signature size
suggests that implicit stimuli affect signature size when they are
associated with the experience of bodily states. Experiments two
and three were therefore aimed to substantiate this embodiment
view by examining the crucial idea that a sense (i.e., the
experience) of bodily processes is associated with greater changes
in signature size than when bodily processes are just present.
Consistent with this idea, Haefner [15] found that individual
differences in the sensitivity to stimuli originating inside the body
(interoceptive awareness) moderated the influence of bodily cues
on cognition. Thus, we hypothesized that participants’ signature
size would increase when processing information in a manner that
enhanced focus on the experience of sensory-perceptual material
(i.e., experiential self-focus) compared to focus on the conceptual
meaning of such material (i.e., conceptual self-focus; Experiments
2 and 3), or when attention was externally oriented (i.e., non-self-
focus; Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also included a small sample
of patients with anorexia nervosa (AN). AN is a disorder that is
commonly associated with self-evaluation, experiential avoidance,
and a sense of disembodiment [17,18]. Experiential self-focus has
been found to ameliorate psychopathology in AN presumably
through restoring a sense of the body as it actually is rather than as
it is ‘thought’ to be [19,20]. However, the impact of experiential
manipulations on signature size has not been examined in this
group although clinical observations have reported small signa-
tures in AN [21,22]. AN may lend itself particularly well for testing
the principle that promoting a sense of embodiment is associated
with increases in signature size as this group commonly shows
lowered levels of accuracy in body awareness. Thus, Experiment 3
also examined whether experiential self-focus was associated with
larger increases in signature size in patients with AN in
comparison with healthy controls.
In all experiments, we focussed on within-subject variations in
signature size given potential concerns over controlling for stylistic
elements of handwriting (e.g., the configuration or shape of letters).
Signature size was measured following the procedure by
Zweigenhaft and Marlowe [5] (see Experiment 1 for details). We
examined the reliability of this procedure by collecting signatures
from 30 university students (none of these students participated in
the experiments reported in this paper). Signature size measure-
ments were carried out separately by the first author and two
independent raters who were not involved in the current
experiments or aware of their purpose. The intra-class correlation
coefficient (ICC) was .97, suggesting a high degree of measurement
consistency across raters. The reliability of this measurement
procedure of signature size was verified in Experiment 1
(ICC= .96). For Experiments 2 and 3, measurements were
calculated by the first author, following the established procedure.
Experiment 1
Materials and Methods
Fifty Oxford University students (36 females, 14 males) free
from current or past axis I DSM-IV disorders (as assessed with the
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) [23]) were
randomly assigned to subliminal evaluative (N=23) or non-
affective (N=27) conditioning. Prior to the subliminal condition-
ing procedure, participants completed visual analogue scales
(VAS) from 0–10 for current mood and self-esteem (‘happy’,
‘warm towards self’), a state anxiety inventory [24], the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) [25] and the Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale
(SISE) [26]. Signatures were obtained by asking participants to
sign the SISE. There was no restriction of line or space. Signature
size reflected the total area covered by the signature (in cm2):
Height (highest to lowest point)6length (from beginning of the first
to the end of the last letter) [5].
The subliminal conditioning procedures were identical to those
used previously by Dijksterhuis [27] and were presented as part of
a target discrimination task that required participants to indicate
whether nonsense words began with a vowel or consonant. The
task consisted of a total of 30 trials (the interval between trials was
1000 ms). Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation
string (‘XXX’) for 500 ms. For participants in the experimental
condition (evaluative conditioning), in 15 out of the 30 trials, the
fixation string was followed by the presentation of the word ‘I’ and
a positive adjective (presented for 16 ms each which has previously
been shown to bypass conscious awareness [19]). No subliminal
stimuli were presented in the remaining 15 trials. Examples of
positive adjectives used in this study were happy, funny, smart and
strong (average positive valence rating = 7.59, rating scale from 1–
10; [28]). The subliminal stimuli were masked by immediate
presentation of a nonsense word. 30 nonsense words were
presented (15 beginning with a vowel, 15 beginning with a
consonant). At the end of the trial, participants indicated whether
the nonsense word began with a vowel or consonant by pressing
one of two response keys (see Figure 1 for task procedure). In the
control condition (non-affective conditioning) neutral nouns
instead of positive adjective were presented (e.g., bench, pillow,
paper, and calendar; average positive valence rating = 5.89, rating
scale from 1–10; [28]). The procedures were identical otherwise.
Following this manipulation, measurements of mood, self-
esteem and signature size were repeated. Participants were then
asked whether they were aware of any stimuli that were flashed on
screen during the discrimination task after which they completed
an awareness task to assess their ability to detect these stimuli. At
the beginning of this task, participants were told that they had to
pay attention to words that would be flashed on screen following a
fixation string. The awareness task consisted of 30 trials: Following
presentation of a fixation string (500 ms), a positive adjective or
neutral noun (the order was randomized) was presented on screen
for 16 ms, which was followed by a nonsense word. Participants
were asked to ignore the nonsense word and indicate whether a
positive or neutral word had preceded its presentation.
Participants in the two conditions did not differ in terms of the
gender ratio, handedness, age, years of education, depression, or
anxiety levels (ps..12). All participants signed informed consent
Embodiment and Signature Size
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prior to taking part in the study. The study was approved by the
Oxford University Research Ethics Committee.
Results and Discussion
A 2 (condition: experimental, control)62 (time: pre, post)62
(gender: male, female) repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) indicated a significant increase in signature size
following subliminal evaluative relative to non-affective condition-
ing, F(1,46) = 4.03, p= .05, partial g2 = .08 (Table 1). The average
increase in signature size was 13.1% in the experimental condition
whereas there was a 1.79% decrease in the control condition. This
finding was not moderated by gender (there were no effects of
gender throughout the analysis and gender was therefore removed
in following analyses). There were no manipulation-related
changes on the IAT (a decrease across time, F(1,48) = 5.21,
p= .03, was possibly due to a practice effect) [17], trait, or
momentary self-esteem, Fs,1.78, ps..18. The subliminal condi-
tioning procedure had no effect on mood, Fs,1.32, ps..25. No
participant reported having seen any of the subliminally presented
stimuli. Results from the awareness check also indicated no
awareness of subliminal stimuli (correct classifications of positive
and neutral words was at chance-level: experimental M=14.83
(2.01) vs. control M=14.93 (1.82); t(48) = .18, p= .86). Thus,
subliminal evaluative conditioning induced increases in signature
size relative to non-affective conditioning in the absence of
changes on subjective reports of mood and self-esteem. These
findings substantiate that increases in signature were caused by
implicit affective stimuli. There was only a small (non-significant)
positive correlation between self-reported trait self-esteem and pre-
manipulation signature (r= .11, p= .44).
These findings suggest that implicit processes contribute to
increases in signature size. Prior studies have shown that bodily
states have implicit effects on cognition and affect [8,9,15]. Thus,
one explanation for the effect of implicit affective cues on signature
size - consistent with perspectives of embodied cognition - is that
this reflects bodily/sensory experiences. If this is the case, increases
in signature size should be evident when the experience of bodily
processes (i.e., a sense of the body) is facilitated than when it is
Figure 1. Trial illustration of the subliminal evaluative conditioning procedure. Neutral nouns instead of positive adjectives were
presented in the control condition (non-affective conditioning). A presentation rate of 16 ms was chosen as this has been shown to bypass conscious
awareness in previous studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088438.g001
Table 1. The impact of subliminal evaluative (experimental)
and non-affective (control) conditioning on self-esteem, mood
and signature size.
Experimental (N=23) Control (N=27)
M (SD) M (SD)
IAT
Pre .76 (.28) .79 (.43)
Post .65 (.27) .67 (.37)
Happy
Pre 6.37 (1.53) 6.67 (1.58)
Post 6.47 (1.43) 6.87 (1.43)
State anxiety
Pre 34.22 (7.21) 31.37 (6.81)
Post 33.39 (8.93) 32.81 (7.73)
Warm towards self
Pre 6.63 (1.55) 6.70 (1.48)
Post 6.26 (1.74) 6.91 (1.86)
Trait self-esteem
Pre 4.96 (1.26) 4.96 (1.19)
Post 4.91 (1.24) 5.11 (1.12)
Signature size
Pre 5.42 (6.48) 6.69 (4.94)
Post 6.13 (5.97) 6.57 (4.48)
Footnote. IAT = Implicit Association Test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088438.t001
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inhibited. The next two experiments therefore compared the
effects of information processing styles that either facilitated
(experiential self-focus) or inhibited (conceptual self-focus) experi-
ences of bodily states on signature size and self-report outcomes.
This allowed us to further examine an embodiment explanation of
signature size.
Experiment 2
Materials and Methods
30 female participants (Mean age = 20.53, SD=2.65) free from
psychiatric disorder (as determined by the MINI [23]) completed
both conceptual and experiential self-focus inductions a week
apart from each other in counterbalanced order. Prior to these
self-focus inductions, ratings of current mood, self-esteem and
signature size were obtained.
The conceptual and experiential self-focus manipulations [29]
contain the same 28 items related to self, body-state and emotions
(e.g., ‘‘the physical sensations in your body’’) that participants
concentrate upon for eight minutes. The difference between the
inductions lies in how to focus attention on this material. The
predominant quality of conceptual self-focus is thinking about
reasons and implications, whereas experiential self-focus is
characterized by sustained attention to sensory-perceptual fea-
tures. The exact directions to participants in the conceptual
condition were to ‘‘to think about the causes, meanings and
consequences of each item and spend a few moments concentrat-
ing on each item, attempting to make sense of and understand the
issues raised by the item’’. Instructions in the experiential
condition directed participants ‘‘to focus your mind on your
experience for each item, concentrating on the quality of what you
sense’’. In both conditions, participants were asked to read each
item silently and slowly to themselves and to work through the list
of items at their own pace.
Subsequently, in order to verify induction of the intended style
of self-focus, participants were asked to indicate on two VAS (from
0–100) the degree they were processing material (1) conceptually
(‘‘I was focussed on trying to understand, explain or make sense of
things’’) and (2) experientially (‘‘I was focussed on my sensory
experience, noticing my body and physical sensations’’) during the
self-focus tasks. They also completed a third VAS (from 0–100) to
verify the overall degree of self-focus during the experimental tasks
(‘‘I was focussed on myself’’).
Finally, post-manipulation measurements of mood, self-esteem
and signature size were obtained. All participants signed informed
consent prior to taking part in the study. The study was approved
by the Oxford University Research Ethics Committee. Both
testing sessions took place in the same setting and at the same time
of day whenever possible (i.e., both assessments in the morning or
afternoon).
Results and Discussion
Pre-manipulation signature sizes across conditions were highly
correlated, r= .90. As in Experiment 1, there was a small (non-
significant) positive correlation between self-reported self-esteem
and pre-manipulation signature size (r= .11, p= .58). Both
manipulations had similar effects on the extent of self-focus
(conceptual M=84.00 (13.92) vs. experiential M=83.50 (20.64);
t(29) = .14, p= .89). The overall degree of self-focus across
conditions was not associated with the average change in signature
size, r=2.17, p= .36. The conceptual manipulation led to higher
levels of conceptual thinking than the experiential manipulation
(M=71.33 (17.86) vs. M=51.83 (28.02); t(29) = 3.28, p,.01),
whereas the opposite pattern was evident on the experiential check
(M=54.23 (26.76) vs. M=76.54 (11.44); t(29) = 3.85, p,.01),
suggesting that the manipulation successfully increased focus on
sensory-perceptual features.
A repeated measures ANOVA (the factors were time and
condition) indicated a significant increase in signature size in the
experiential relative to the conceptual self-focus condition,
F(1,29) = 6.16, p= .02, partial g2 = .18 (Table 2). The average
increase in signature size was 11.41% compared to a 1.71%
decrease, consistent with the idea that processing stimuli in a
manner that promotes experiential self-focus increases signature
size. The self-focus manipulations had no influence on mood or
self-esteem, Fs,2.32, ps..13. The change following experiential
self-focus was twice as large compared to manipulation-unrelated
change between pre-manipulation measurements (11.41% versus
5.40%).
Experiment 3
Materials and Methods
Thirteen female Oxford University students and 13 female in-
patients with the severe eating disorder AN were recruited. All
participants completed three conditions approximately one week
apart from each other: conceptual, experiential, and non-self-
focus. As in Experiment 2, testing took place in the same setting
across the three assessments and at the same time of day whenever
possible. The six possible orders of condition were counterbal-
anced. The two groups were matched on age (M=24.46,
SD=4.74 versus M=25.77, SD=4.85; t(24) = .70, p= .49) and
verbal IQ (M=119.77, SD=3.39 versus M=121.00, SD=3.70;
t(24) = .88, p= .39). The procedure was identical to Experiment 2.
The only exception was that this experiment included a third (non-
self-focus) condition in which participants read facts about DIY
(do-it-yourself). The reason for adding this condition was to
establish the direction of self-focus effects on signature size.
Specifically, this allowed us to examine whether enhancing focus
on sensory cues was causally related to increases in signature size,
thus supporting the prediction that this was due to a greater sense
of embodiment. Although the DIY condition might also facilitate
focus on physical experiences (physical actions), this would not
necessarily be expected to promote a focus on sensory-perceptual
Table 2. The impact of conceptual and experiential self-focus
on mood, self-esteem, and signature size.
Conceptual self-focus Experiential self-focus
M (SD) M (SD)
Happy
Pre 6.08 (2.16) 6.88 (1.15)
Post 5.54 (2.29) 6.64 (1.60)
Anxious
Pre 2.58 (2.33) 2.29 (2.17)
Post 2.84 (2.35) 2.08 (2.24)
At one with self
Pre 5.98 (2.42) 6.27 (2.27)
Post 6.04 (2.64) 6.60 (2.30)
Signature size
Pre 3.52 (1.77) 3.33 (1.93)
Post 3.46 (1.81) 3.71 (1.72)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088438.t002
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sensations and therefore affect signature size. Ethical approval for
the study was obtained and all participants signed informed
consent prior to participation.
Results and Discussion
Pre-manipulation signature sizes across conditions were highly
correlated in both groups (healthy group: average r= .86; AN:
average r= .67). The average pre-manipulation signature was
smaller in the AN group (M=3.73 (1.75) vs. M=4.39 (1.91)),
consistent with earlier reports [21,22], but this difference was not
significant, t= .92, p= .37, likely due to insufficient power.
Our main interest lay in examining the within-subject effect of
the self-focus manipulations. Results from the manipulation checks
replicated the pattern from Experiment 2: Higher levels of
conceptual thinking were shown following the conceptual versus
experiential self-focus induction, F(2,23) = 6.89, p= .01, whereas
higher levels of sensory focus were found in the experiential versus
the conceptual self-focus condition, F(2,23) = 22.51, p,.01 (higher
levels of sensory focus were also evident following experiential self-
focus compared to the non-self-focus condition). Further, the non-
self-focus condition was associated with less self-focus than the
other two conditions, F(2,23) = 187.20, p,.01.
A repeated measures ANOVA showed an increase in signature
size following experiential relative to both conceptual and non-self-
focus, F(2,23) = 4.36, p= .03, partial g2 = .28 (Table 3), where
there was an average increase of 12.50% compared with decreases
of 1.29% in the conceptual and 3.38% in the control condition.
These effects occurred in the absence of manipulation effects on
mood or self-esteem and were not moderated by group, Fs,1.90,
ps..16, although the mean increase in signature size following
experiential self-focus was larger in the patient group as we
expected (Table 3). Overall, results from this study replicate the
findings that increases in signature size reflect the impact of a sense
of embodiment.
General Discussion
A person’s signature size has been said to reveal ‘hidden’ aspects
of how the self is perceived although scientific clarification of this
claim has been scarce. We conducted three experiments to
examine whether changes in signature size can be induced
experimentally, specifically by promoting a person’s implicit sense
of embodiment. The processing of physical states is a prerequisite
to a felt ‘sense’ of self and the embodied cognition literature
suggests that even subtle manipulations of bodily cues (i.e., cues
that participants are not aware of) influence cognitive processes
[7,8]. The impact of implicit cues on cognition has been widely
demonstrated [14], although no study has examined effects on
signature size. Demonstrating that implicit affective cues modulate
a person’s signature size would thus provide strong support for the
view that signature size is related to an implicit sense of self.
Indeed, results from our first experiment showed that exposure to
implicit positive affective cues led to significant increases in
signature size relative to implicit non-affective conditioning.
Supporting the view that these effects were due to implicit
influences, increases in signature size occurred in the absence of
changes in conscious feelings. Further, no participant reported
awareness of the subliminal stimuli.
Subsequently, we conducted two further experiments to directly
examine the critical claim that increases in signature size are
associated with a sense of embodiment. These experiments
examined the impact of a focus on the experience of bodily cues
relative to conceptually thinking about such material (Experiments
2 and 3) and externally-oriented attention (i.e., non-self-focus;
Experiment 3). As hypothesized, results from both experiments
showed that experiential processing of sensory and affective
material caused within-subject increases in signature size relative
to conceptual processing (Experiments 2 and 3) and a non-self-
focus control task (Experiment 3). Experiential processing was
associated with greater sensory-perceptual focus compared to the
other two conditions, supporting the view that a sense of
embodiment was causal in increasing signature size. Indeed, the
increase in signature size was also evident in relation to the non-
self-focus control condition in Experiment 3 which encouraged
participants to think about physical actions, thus highlighting that
a focus on sensory-perceptual sensations is likely to be the critical
dimension underlying increases in signature size, consistent with
embodiment views of cognition. Experiment 3 also showed that
the same pattern of results was evident in patients with the severe
eating disorder AN. This severe eating disorder characteristically
features body image distortion, low experiential awareness and a
lack of embodiment [30,31] with anecdotal evidence of small
signatures [21,22]. Aiding experiential self-focus has previously
been shown to improve psychopathology in some individuals with
AN [19,20]. The increase in signature size substantiates the view
that this is achieved through restoring a more accurate sense of the
Table 3. The impact of conceptual-, experiential- and non-self-focus on mood, self-esteem, and signature size for healthy
participants and patients with anorexia nervosa.
Conceptual self-focus Experiential self-focus Non-self-focus
HG (N=13) AN (N=13) HG (N=13) AN (N=13) HG (N=13) AN (N=13)
Happy
Pre 5.89 (1.38) 3.14 (1.55) 6.27 (1.05) 2.18 (1.89) 6.07 (1.21) 3.87 (1.98)
Post 5.28 (1.46) 2.72 (1.70) 5.57 (1.60) 2.23 (2.06) 5.62 (1.03) 4.22 (1.76)
At one with self
Pre 6.44 (1.53) 2.99 (2.39) 6.72 (1.55) 2.04 (2.28) 6.21 (2.39) 3.08 (2.13)
Post 6.43 (1.75) 2.48 (1.63) 5.82 (2.36) 1.90 (1.65) 6.70 (1.80) 3.56 (2.50)
Signature size
Pre 4.28 (1.55) 3.46 (1.63) 4.60 (2.49) 3.72 (1.70) 4.28 (1.98) 4.01 (2.57)
Post 4.04 (1.41) 3.61 (2.34) 4.90 (2.41) 4.45 (2.10) 4.37 (1.97) 3.63 (2.07)
Footnote: HG =Healthy group; AN= anorexia nervosa. Standard deviations in brackets next to mean values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088438.t003
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body as it is. Contrary to our expectation, we did not find
significantly greater increases in signature size following experien-
tial self-focus in patients with AN relative to the healthy control
group, although the means were in the expected direction.
Replication of these findings in larger samples is therefore
warranted.
Further, a number of other issues need acknowledgment and
require consideration in future studies. First, although changes in
signature size were unrelated to explicit assessments of mood and
self-esteem this does not rule out that no such effects were present.
These may have been obscured by participants’ desire to remain
consistent in their self-assessment over time when completing
mood and self-esteem scales repeatedly in close proximity. Lack of
power is an alternative explanation for the absence of concurrent
changes in self-reported variables. Second, an important issue that
remains to be clarified is whether increases in signature size are
specifically related to a positive sense of self as Zweigenhaft [6]
speculated. Our studies were not designed to address this issue.
However, our findings may suggest that increases in signature size
reflect a general sense of embodiment or ‘groundedness’. The
items which composed our self-focus manipulations (e.g., ‘the
physical sensations in your body’, ‘the way you feel inside’) are not
related to positive sensations in an obvious way. Indeed, in patients
with AN they may give rise to negative sensations. Nevertheless, an
increase in signature size following experiential processing was also
apparent in this group. Third, future studies should also rule out
the possibility that the increase in signature size following
experiential self-focus is related to participants paying more
attention to writing their signatures due to the increased focus on
sensory-perceptual features (e.g., which may lead them to trying to
write more clearly, in turn, possibly inflating signature size). This
explanation is unlikely given that Experiment 1 demonstrated
increases in signature size following an implicit manipulation, but
our studies cannot fully address this.
In conclusion, findings from three experiments provide consis-
tent and convergent support for the suggestion that a person’s
signature size is associated with an implicit sense of embodiment.
As such, measuring changes in signature size provides an
unobtrusive method for measuring the impact of subtle cues on
cognition.
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